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International Claims of Nationals of
Both the Claimant and Respondent
States-The Case History of a Myth
The Myth and Its Origin
An international claim is a demand of one government upon
another through diplomatic channels or an international tribunal, for
redress for acts or omissions for which the respondent government is
contended responsible under international law or provisions of a
treaty.'
The modern state practice of espousing private claims against
foreign governments began with the treaty of November 19, 1794,
between the United States and Great Britain (Jay Treaty). Since
then many scores of treaties have provided for the adjudication of
private claims against governments by sole arbiters or mixed or joint
commissions and their deliberations have brought forth a large mass
of judicial precedents.
The nineteenth century accumulation of a huge body of widely
scattered case-law materials relating to private claims against foreign
governments presents a baffling field for research and it was not until
the closing years of the nineteenth century that scholars began to be
interested in the subject. The publication of Edwin M. Borchard's
treatise, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, in 1916
promptly established the subject as a separate and important branch of
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international law. Borchard's treatise clearly showed the extent of the
mass of legal material that had accumulated during the preceding
century and its susceptibility to systematic analysis for the distillation
of a cohesive body of legal rules. His terminology, classification, and
formulation of legal rules received widespread acceptance.
Before the nineteenth century there were no clearly formulated
rules of customary international law limiting the category of individuals
whose claims a government could espouse, but from the beginning the
usual practice of states has been to espouse only claims of their
nationals. The usual treaty formula has been to give an international
tribunal jurisdiction only over claims of "nationals," "citizens," or
"subjects" of the claimant government against the respondent
government.
As the nation-states emerged from feudalism there seems to have
been general acceptance of the principle that persons born within a
state's territory of parents who are nationals of that state are exclusively
nationals of that state.
There seems also, during the early post-feudal period, to have
been fairly widespread acceptance of the principle that persons born
within a state's territory of the nationals of another state are nationals
of the state of birth (jus soli) .2 This principle was probably the natural
outcome of the intimate connection in feudalism between a person and
the soil upon which he lived.8
The passing of feudalism and the emergence of jus soli gave rise
to the incongruity that children born of a national of one state within
the territory of another would not have the nationality of their father.
This incongruity was overcome by the revival of the Graeco-Roman
principle that membership (nationality) of children in a society follows
the membership (nationality) of their parents (jus sanguinis). Thus
the stage was set for the appearance of a new incongruity, viz., dual or
multiple nationality.
At first there seems to have been some attempt at an accommoda-
tion between the conflicting principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis.
Thus Pothier wrote that under the ancien rdgime a Frenchman's child
born outside France is a French national by jus sanguinis if the father
has not established his domicile outside France and has the intent to
2 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon, liv. i, tit. i., ch. i., No. 146, refers
to this principle as "the rule of Europe."
8 Westlake, International Law, vol. 1, 2d ed. (1910), p. 220.
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return to France; ' the French Constitution of 1791 provided that
persons born in France of a foreign father are French nationals jus
soli if they have fixed their residence in France.'
However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, most states
in their national legislation had moved toward a largely unbridled and
undiscriminating use of jus soli, jus sanguinis, and naturalization of
aliens and international law recognized their competence to do so, thus
giving rise to widespread international conflict of national laws on
nationality. But no instance is known of an international claims settle-
ment treaty which has expressly covered the matter of the tribunal's
jurisdiction regarding the claims of dual nationals, i.e., individual
claimants who are nationals of both the claimant and respondent gov-
ernments under their respective national laws. Thus it has been neces-
sary for each tribunal to interpret its governing treaty in the light of
such general principles, customs, and precedents as seemed appropri-
ate to determine whether a given dual national claimant is to be treated
as either a national of the claimant government or a national of the
respondent government for the purpose of the tribunal's jurisdiction to
hear the claim.
According to Borchard,
The principle generally followed [by international tribunals]
has been that a person having dual nationality cannot make one
of the countries to which he owes allegiance a defendant before
an international tribunal. 6
In support of his formulation of the foregoing rule, Borchard cites
the decisions of international tribunals in the cases of Alexander, Boyd,
Martin, Lebret, Maninat, and Brignone and also says "see also" the
Drummond case.7
Borchard's above formulation of the rule regarding international
claims on behalf of dual nationals has long been widely accepted.
However, examination of the cases cited by Borchard, and of the his-
tory of the treatment by international tribunals of such claims, shows
that Borchard's supposed rule is a myth-or at best an inaccurate
oversimplification of the body of precedents existing when he wrote,
and subsequently.
4Pothier, Des Personnes et des Choses (1778), partie i., tit. ii., sec. i., p. 399.
Quoted, in II Knapp 308, 13 Eng. Rep. 498.
6Op. cit., p. 588.
7 1d., n. 1.
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Exploding the Myth
1. The Privy Council and the British Commission for Claims on
France under the treaties of May 30, 1814, November 20, 1815, and
April25, 1818.8
This Commission, and the Privy Council on appeals therefrom,
decided the earliest known cases touching upon claims on behalf of
dual nationals although none of the claimants were ultimately found
to be dual nationals.
In the Devereux case ( 1819) ' the decedent suffering the loss for
which claim was made was a British national jus soli who, so the Com-
mission found, had taken out letters of French naturalization in 1776
and made his home in France until 1791 when he returned to England
and his French property was confiscated. Under the then English law,
the foreign naturalization of an English national did not divest him of
English nationality so the decedent could have been considered by the
Commission to be a dual national. The Commission denied the claim
but not on the ground the decedent was a dual national and not on the
ground that under English law or policy he had lost the right to the
protection of the British government. The Commission denied the
claim on the ground the decedent was not a "British subject" within
the meaning of the treaties. On appeal the Privy Council considered
that the Commission had acted upon a correct principle but
reversed the Commission on the ground that the decedent's French
naturalization was not proven.
The Devereux case, standing alone, can be said to be insignificant
as laying down an international test of "nationality" for international
claims purposes because the claimant (decedent) was a national of
the claimant state (Britain) but was not found to be a national of the
respondent state (France). However, in the Drummond case 10
8 This was a "domestic" claims commission. By treaties of May 30, 1814,
and November 20, 1815, it was provided that the British and French Govern-
ments would name Commissioners to examine and settle claims of "British
subjects" against the French Government for the confiscation of their property
in France. But the Commissioners could not agree among themselves and by
a convention of April 25, 1818, France made a lump sum settlement to be
distributed by British Commissioners. This was done pursuant to a statute
(59 Geo. 3, c. 91) which provided that claimants could appeal the Com-
missioners' awards to the King in Council. See 2 Knapp 10-12, 298; 12 Eng.
Rep. 383-384, 494; 2 Russ. 608, 38 Eng. Rep. 464.
9 Described in Hill v. Reardon, 2 Russ. 608, 38 Eng. Rep. 464, and in the
Drummond case, below, n. 10.
10 2 Knapp. 295, 12 Eng. Rep. 492.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 3
404/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
(1834) the claimant (decedent) was a national of the claimant state
(Britain) and was not a national of the respondent state (France) but
both the Commission and the Privy Council clearly denied the claim on
the ground the decedent was not a British national for the purpose of
the claims treaties.
In the Drummond case the decedent suffering the loss for which
claim was made a third generation British national jus sanguinis
through his grandfather who was a British national jus soli. The dece-
dent made his home in France until 1792 when he took up residence in
England and thereafter his property in France was confiscated. The
Commission denied the claim on the ground the decedent was not a
British national for the purpose of the claims conventions; appeal was
taken to the Privy Council which affirmed the denial.
Before the Privy Council it was argued against the claim that the
decedent was a French national jus soli and,
Admitting that . . . [the decedent] . . . technically speak-
ing . . . was, according to the statutes of this country, a British
subject, still treaties must be interpreted according to the law of
nations, which requires words to be taken in their ordinary mean-
ing, not in the artificial sense which may have been imposed upon
them by the particular statutes of a particular nation. When,
therefore a treaty speaks of the subjects of any nation it must
mean those who are actually and effectually under its rule and
government, not those, who although living out of its dominions,
and never having been subject to its government, it may choose
to designate its subjects in its own municipal laws and statutes.
It never could have been the intention of the framers of this treaty
that the expression, 'British subjects,' should include persons
who were also French subjects. How could, indeed, a French
negotiator be acquainted with the technical rule of English law,
by which a man, whose father and himself were born in France,
is to be considered a British subject? [Italics added.]
It was argued for the claim that
The simple question is, whether the expression 'British subjects,'
occurring in a treaty entered into on behalf of the British nation,
is to be interpreted to mean that class of individuals who are
designated as such by the laws and statutes of Great Britain, or
whether a restricted and confined sense is to be attributed to it,
according to some new and undefined rule of international law,
as has been contended for on the other side. . ..
The Vice-Chancellor, in delivering the "advice" of the Privy
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Council affirming the denial of the claim, accepted the former
argument:
• . . But though formally and literally, by the law of Great
Britain, he [the decedent] was a British subject, the question
is, whether he was a British subject within the meaning of the
treaty.... Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that although
[the decedent] was technically a British subject [at the time of
confiscation], yet he was also, at the same time, in form and in
substance, a French subject, domiciled in France, with all the
marks and attributes of French character. He and his family had
resided in France for more than a century; and the act of violence
that was done towards him was done by the French Government
in the exercise of its municipal authority over its own subjects.
[Italics added.]
Throughout the argument of the case before the Privy Council it
was assumed that the decedent had been born in French territory. It
was subsequently brought to the attention of the Council that he had
been born in Avignon while that city was Vatican territory and that he
was therefore only a British subject and not a French subject, and a
rehearing was requested. This request was denied by the Privy Council
on the ground that it was:
• . . satisfied upon the facts that [the decedent and his father],
did sufficiently indicate by their conduct their intention to accept
the character of French subjects; so that their estates could not
be considered as "indument confisqu6s," within the meaning
of the treaty of 1814; and their Lordships think that the fact of
the birth of [the decedent] at Avignon (now for the first time
brought before them) does not vary the case. [Italics added.]
Before the petition for rehearing, the holding of the Privy Coun-
cil may fairly be said to be that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim
on the ground that the parties to the treaty could not have intended
the phrase "British subjects" to include such who were also French
nationals and who in their daily lives were in fact more closely con-
nected with France. And the petition for rehearing was denied on the
ground that the treaty was not intended to include "British subjects"
who, although not French nationals, had indicated by their conduct
their intention to regard themselves as French nationals.
In the cases of Countess Conway (1834), Andre (1821), and
Wellesley (no date given) 11 the claimants were French nationals (jus
soli) and wives or widows of British nationals but did not acquire
112 Knapp. 364, 12 Eng. Rep. 522.
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British nationality nor apparently lose French nationality by such mar-
riage. Mrs. Andre and Mrs. Wellesley were held entitled to claim
against France on the ground that, although aliens, they had British
character for the purpose of the claims treaties because actually resid-
ing in England. Countess Conway's claim was denied for lack of
evidence of actual residence in England.
2. The American-British Commission under the Convention of
February 8, 1853.
Although apparently no case before this Commission involved a
claim of a dual national, this topic was very instructively discussed by
counsel and Commissioners for both Governments in the Laurent
case. 2
In Laurent the inquiry was whether the Laurents had standing
to claim as "British subjects" (jus soli) against the United States for
their losses caused by United States military forces in Mexico where
the Laurents had resided as merchants for twenty years, or whether
the latter fact gave them Mexican character, i.e., rendered them not
British for the purpose of the claims convention. Counsel for both
sides agreed that this was a question of interpretation of the convention
in the light of international law. The British counsel argued that
Drummond did not apply because the Laurents had not become Mexi-
can nationals. Counsel for the United States argued that Drummond
required only that they be resident in Mexico and hence were not
British subjects within the meaning of the claims convention. The
claim was allowed.
The opinion of the American Commissioner includes the
following:
The international definition of 'subject' is also recognized and
adjudged in Drummond's case . . ., where it was holden that
though an individual might be formally and literally by the law
of Great Britain a British subject, still there was a question beyond
that, and that was whether he was a British subject within the
meaning of the treaty then under consideration; and it was there
contended that all treaties must be interpreted according to the
law of nations, and that where a treaty speaks of the subjects of
any nation it means those who are actually and effectually under
its rule and government, and not those who for certain purposes
under the mere municipal obligations of a country may be held
to maintain that character. . . . Suppose, for instance, that an
12 III Moore, History & Digest of Int. Arb. 2671 ff.
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American citizen whose grandfather was born in England
should come before this commission . . . to enforce his claim
here against his own country, will it answer for this commission
to say that by the law of England he is a British subject, and as
such we must hear him? Surely not ...
In similar vein the opinion of the British Commissioner included
the following:
Drummond's case . . . has been especially relied on. The
reasons, however, which are expressly given for the decision in
that case, show it was not determined on the mere fact of the
claimant being domiciled in France, but that from special cir-
cumstances-such as accepting military employment under the
French crown-he had voluntarily taken upon himself the
character of a French subject, and having done so, the new French
Government had a right to treat him as such, and consequently
that he was not entitled to indemnity.
If there had been analagous circumstances in the present
case, I might have felt bound to hold that the Messers. Laurent
were not entitled to resume at pleasure, for their advantage, the
character of British subjects. . . . I can not find any force in
the argument, that if the Messers. Laurent are admitted under
this convention as British subjects, thousands of American
citizens by birth having claims against the American Govern-
ment, might also have presented them before the Commissioners
as British subjects by descent. If I am right in the rule of interpre-
tation which I have adopted, it is clear that they could not ...
3. The American-Mexican Commission under the Convention of
July 4, 1868.
This tribunal decided the Martin case (1871)18 which is the
earliest of cases cited by Borchard in support of the supposed rule that
a dual national ipso facto may not claim against either government of
which he is a national. Martin was a United States national (jus soli)
who had taken employment as an officer of a Mexican Government ves-
sel. Under United States law such employment had no effect on his
United States nationality but under Mexican law such employment
clothed him with Mexican nationality. The Commission denied his
claim against Mexico for unpaid salary on the ground that
It can already be said that all enlightened governments agree
that it is an international duty to recognize the naturalization of
their subjects in other countries. That duty, it is certain, has
not been recognized in all legislations, because, perhaps, it is
is Id., 2467.
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not in harmony with the national, political, and judicial institu-
tions; but it has been accepted explicitly or implicitly in inter-
national transactions. Thus it has become a part of the law of
nations, and now constitutes a rule to decide questions pending
between sovereign nations. Consequently, it ought to be accepted
as a guide in the decisions given by this commission, whenever
it may be deemed applicable, as it is, according to our opinion in
the present case. John T. Martin, a native of North Carolina,
acquired the Mexican citizenship according to the laws of that
country; by that same fact he was deprived of the American
citizenship; and, this being his condition at the time of acquiring
the right alleged by him, it is evident that he had no legitimate
personality to prefer a claim against the Republic of Mexico.
The foregoing rationale has never been regarded as a generally
accepted rule of international law. Nevertheless, in the light of such
rationale it is obvious that Martin does not support Borchard's sup-
posed rule regarding dual nationals, even though there exists in the
case the juxtaposition of the facts that Martin was a Mexican national
under Mexican law and that the claim was denied.
In several cases 1, not involving dual nationals in which the Com-
mission held that foreign residence did not in itself divest the claimant
of his nationality, counsel for the United States observed that only in
the case of dual nationals is it generally held that residence or actual
domicile "might properly determine for practical purposes" their
national character as between the two countries.
In other cases 11 not involving dual nationals the Commission held
that a real and actual residence in the United States plus a declaration
of intent to become a citizen would confer American nationality for
the purpose of the convention. In many cases where such a claimant
had not maintained his actual residence in the United States he was
denied claimant status." The logic of the foregoing holdings would
apply even if the claimant was technically a national of the respondent
state.
In the Schreck case (1874)" the claimants were American
nationals jus sanguinis but were born in Mexico. The umpire held
that since Mexico was entitled to regard them as Mexican nationals by
birth, "the umpire is therefore of the opinion that [they] . . . have no
standing before the mixed commission and cannot claim, as citizens
of the United States, against the country of their birth." In assessing
14 Id., 2695 ff.
15Id., 2713 ff.
I8 Id., 2718 ff.
17 Id., 2450. The decision was vacated and the claim allowed upon new
evidence that the claimants never acquired Mexican nationality.
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the weight of this opinion as declaratory of international law, it should
be noted that: (1) it is given solely as the umpire's opinion without
citation of authority of state practice, judicial precedent, or publicists;
(2) it is a fair factual inference that the claimants had always resided
in Mexico.
4. The American-British Commission under the Treaty of May 8,
1871.
The opinion of this tribunal in the Alexander case ( 1872) 18 is the
only one cited by Borchard which supports-superficially-his formu-
lation of the supposed general rule regarding dual nationals.
Great Britain made claim on behalf of the estate of Alexander,
owner of certain real property in Kentucky which was damaged by
United States forces in the Civil War. Alexander was a United States
national jus soli and a British national jus sanguinis. In his early
youth he returned to his father's home in Scotland where he grew up
and for many years held public office. During the Civil War his
residence was partly in Scotland and partly in Kentucky, where he
died in 1867.
Counsel for the United States admitted by demurrer that Alex-
ander had always held himself a British national and had been so
regarded by all others, but counsel contended that as a dual national
he was not a "British subject" within the meaning of the treaty, citing
Drummond.
Counsel for Great Britain argued that Alexander's position was
not like that of Drummond because Drummond was held to have
sufficiently indicated by his conduct his intention to accept the char-
acter of French national whereas Alexander had never indicated his
intention to accept the character of American national. On the con-
trary, he had always claimed to be a British national and was recog-
nized as such by special legislation of Kentucky empowering him to
hold property there notwithstanding his alienage and residence in
Scotland.
The Commission by a 2 to 1 vote held that it had no jurisdiction
over the claim. The American commissioner, Frazer, rendered an
opinion in which the presiding neutral commissioner concurred,
concluding as follows:
Being, then, a subject of both governments, was he a British
subject within the meaning of the treaty? The practice of nations
in such cases is believed to be for their sovereign to leave the
18 Id., 2529; Hale's Rep., For. Rels. 1873, vol. III, p. 15.
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person who has embarrassed himself by assuming a double alle-
giance to the protection which he may find provided for him by
the municipal laws of that other sovereign to whom he thus also
owes allegiance. To treat his grievances against that other sov-
ereign as subjects of international concern would be to claim a
jurisdiction paramount to that of the other nation of which he is
also a subject. Complications would inevitably result, for no
government would recognize the right of another to interfere thus
in behalf of one whom it regarded as a subject of its own. It has
certainly not been the practice of the British Government to
interfere in such cases, and it is not easy to believe that either
government meant to provide for them by this treaty. In Drum-
mond's case the terms of the treaty were quite as comprehensive
as those of this treaty, and yet it was there held that the
claimant was not within the treaty, not being within its inten-
tion. This was held even after it was ascertained that he was not
a French subject, he having merely evinced his intention to regard
himself as a French subject.
There are several reasons for believing that the actual rationale
of Frazer's opinion is that, for claims purposes as between the two
governments of which he is a national, a dual national is deemed to be
a national of the government with which he has the most significant
contact (usually residence) at the time of loss or injury. In this case it
was the respondent, United States, because at the time of loss, Alex-
ander had resumed residence in the United States, the country of his
birth, where he died without ever returning to Scotland.
Frazer's opinion, above, refers to "the person who has embar-
rassed himself by assuming a double allegiance" and says that "It has
certainly not been the practice of the British Government to interfere
in such cases. . . ." No evidence has been found that at this time
(1872) the British Government, other governments, or international
tribunals allowed the claim of a dual national per se to be brought as
a matter of law against a government of which he is a national. The
cases discussed above are evidence to the contrary. Frazer's reference
is to the British practice regarding persons who (unlike Alexander-a
dual national at birth) by their own act became dual nationals, i.e.,
persons who acquired a second nationality by naturalization. From
the beginning of the nineteenth century until 1870, an Englishman
naturalized abroad remained an Englishman in the eyes of English law.
If he returned to British territory he was held to be unentitled to the
protection of his adopted government. However, when residing in his
adopted country, he was held to be bound by his own act of renuncia-
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tion of his English character and so he was refused the protection of
the British Government to which he acknowledged no duties. But this
refusal of protection was not considered to be based upon any rule of
international law; it was a discretionary attitude of the British
Government toward its own national.' 9
Analysis of Frazer's reliance on Drummond also indicates that
Frazer's actual rationale in Alexander was the characterization of
Alexander as being resident or domiciled in the respondent state at the
time of loss. In Alexander counsel for Britain argued, and counsel for
the United States admitted by demurrer, that Alexander had evinced
his intent to regard himself as a British national; but counsel for the
United States argued that the mere fact of Alexander's American
nationality per se meant the claim could not be entertained. However,
Frazer did not base his opinion upon the latter's argument but relied
on the holding in Drummond that the decedent was not within the
treaty phrase "British subjects" even after it was ascertained he had
"merely evinced his intention to regard himself" as a national of the
respondent, France. This would be a sound and consistent ground
for a similar interpretation of "British subject" in Alexander only if
Frazer considered that Alexander by resuming residence in the United
States had evinced his intention to regard himself as a national of the
respondent, United States.
Finally, Frazer's dissent in the Ferris case (1872) 20 in which he
further expounded upon his opinion in Alexander clearly shows his
actual rationale in the latter to be that a dual national for claims pur-
poses is deemed a national of the government in whose territory he
resides.
In Ferris a decedent who was exclusively a British national had
sustained a property loss in the United States for which the United
States was allegedly responsible but the heir and beneficial claimant
was a minor son who was a British national jus sanguinis and an
American national jus soli who apparently resided in the United States.
Counsel for the United States argued that the claim was barred because
of the beneficial claimant's American nationality. Counsel for Britain
argued that the United States could not impress upon the infant heir of
a British national the character of American citizen for the sole pur-
pose of denying him the benefit of the claims treaty. By a vote of 2 to
19 Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws of Naturalization and
Allegiance, Appendix, pp. 31-48 (1869).
20 III Moore, op. cit., 2239-2242.
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1 the Commission allowed the claim in an opinion which said only that
where the decedent "was exclusively a British subject, and the benefi-
ciaries are British subjects as well as American citizens, the claim may
be prosecuted for their benefit." Frazer's dissent included the
following:
By the very words of the treaty . . . the claim must be, first,
for an act done to . . . a British subject. . . . The treaty is
the language of both governments, and must be construed to
effectuate not the intent of one only, but of both. [Emphasis in
original.] If any of its terms have one sense in Great Britain and
another in the United States by reason of their respective laws,
neither of these senses can fairly be taken; another, though
limited, sense must be sought, common to both countries. There
is such a restricted sense of the language employed here. In
Alexander's case I expressed myself on this branch of the present
question. One born in the United States of British parents
residing here [in the United States] would be protected by the
United States as fully as any American against wrongs from other
countries, Great Britain probably not excepted. And Great
Britain would not, as against the United States, intervene in his
behalf, though she would claim him as her subject, and hold him
to accountability as such if found bearing arms against her. And
if born here [in the United States] of British parents during a
temporary sojourn, but afterwards domiciled in England and
never residing here, the United States would practically treat
him as not an American, refusing to intervene in his behalf against
any other government, though she, too, would hold him to
accountability as a citizen if found in arms against her. And so
of persons born in Great Britain of American parents ...
(Emphasis added.)
This tribunal also decided the Boyd case (1873 ),21 cited by
Borchard in support of his formulation of the general rule regarding
claims of dual nationals. Boyd had American nationality jus soli, took
a job in Scotland in 1862, and there received British naturalization in
1864. He immediately returned to the United States on a British pass-
port to take his wife back to Scotland and shortly after arrival in the
United States suffered the injury upon which he based his claim against
the United States. But thereafter he sought and obtained employment
in the United States in his profession and never returned to British
territory. The United States contended Boyd lost his British nation-
ality and was solely a United States national. The Commission dis-
missed the claim without rendering a written opinion. It is just as
21 Id., 2465.
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possible that the Commission believed Boyd had lost his British
nationality, as it believed that he possessed both nationalities. In the
latter event it is also possible the Commission could have regarded his
factual ties with the United States as being closer. In the absence of
any reasoned opinion by the Commission, Borchard was not justified
in citing Boyd in support of his formulation of the general rule merely
because of the coincidence of circumstances that Boyd could be
considered a dual national and his claim was not entertained.
5. The American-French Commission under the Convention of
January 15, 1880.
This tribunal decided the Lebret case (1884) 22 cited by Borchard
in support of his formulation of the general rule. The claim was
presented on behalf of Elise Lebret, a French national jus soli,
and allegedly arose out of the destruction by Federal forces in the
Civil War of the joint property of Mrs. Lebret and her deceased
husband, an American national.
Counsel for the United States demurred to the claim on the
ground that Mrs. Lebret had lost her French nationality and acquired
by marriage the United States nationality of her husband. The Com-
mission unanimously sustained the demurrer without giving any rea-
sons qua Commission.
The French Commissioner in a separate opinion held that since
Mrs. Lebret had lived in the United States for more than forty
years without ever returning to France or contributing to the interests
of France her attachment to France was too platonic to justify France
in demanding compensation for her losses.
The United States Commissioner in a separate opinion held that
Mrs. Lebret had either lost her French nationality, or "If we admit
that there is a conflict of laws in this case, that she is American by
American law and French by French law, then the rule of decision
is, that she is deemed to be a citizen of the country in which she
has her domicile, that is, the United States." In support of this rule
he cited publicists 22 and the Alexander case.
It seems clear the Lebret does not support Borchard's supposed
general rule. The separate opinions of the two national commissioners
in essence are in accord with the Drummond case, above.
22d., 2488.
23 Bluntschli, Int. Law, sec 394; Morse, Citizenship, p. 160; and Twiss, Law
of Nations, pp. 231-232.
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This tribunal also decided two other cases involving dual na-
tionals in a manner contrary to Borchard's general rule.
In the Chopin case (1884)24 claim against the United States was
made on behalf of the children and heirs of Jean Chopin, a French
national who had died in 1870. These children were American
nationals jus soli and had visited and resided in France for brief
periods. During the pendency of the claim one of these children,
Oscar, died leaving as his heirs a widow and five children, American
nationals jus soli. The United States objected that the Commission
had no jurisdiction because of the American nationality of the
children of Jean, and of Oscar.
The American Agent, Boutwell, in his report of the case con-
cludes with the following:
An award was made by the united action of the Commission.
• . . There was, however, no order as to the distribution of the
sum so awarded, nor any indication of opinion on the part of
the Commission as to the citizenship of the children of Oscar
Chopin. It may, however, be assumed fairly that the Commission
were of opinion that the children of Jean Baptiste Chopin, al-
though born in this country, were citizens of France, and that,
inasmuch as the death of Oscar Chopin occurred after the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty and after the presentation of the memorial, his
right to reclamation had become so vested that it descended to
his children independently of the question of their citizenship in
France.
Borchard 25 states that the decision appears "contrary to the
general rule" and that "the decision is not well reasoned." But no
written opinion was rendered. Borchard also echoes Boutwell's ex-
planation that Oscar Chopin had died after the ratification of the
convention. But this explanation fails because Oscar Chopin, him-
self, was a national of both France and the United States. Therefore
it can only be assumed that the Commission felt that the fact that
Jean Chopin, the decedent sustaining the loss, had been exclusively
a French national was sufficient to justify overruling the United
States objection that his heir, Oscar, was also an American national.
In the Petit case ( 1884) special counsel for the claimant against
the United States summarized the facts and his argument as follows:
The evidence in the case shows that Petit was born in
Bordeaux, France, in 1818; that he remained a citizen of France
24 111 Moore, op. cit., 2506; Boutwell, Rep., p. 88.
25 Op. cit., p. 589, n. 2.
261Boutwell, Rep., p. 86.
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until October, 1868, when he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States; that in 1870 he returned to France with his family
and all his means, resumed his native nationality by his declara-
tion and acts, and that he and his family have resided there
continuously since, claiming to have resumed his native citizen-
ship, and that he has been recognized as a French citizen. The
certificate of reintegration as a French citizen (issued by the
French authorities in 1881, five months after his claim was filed)
was only the completion of all evidence on that point to meet
any technical question that might be raised.
Counsel for the United States argued that the claimant did not re-
sume French nationality until September 1881, and that, therefore the
Commission had no jurisdiction (i.e., that Petit was solely an Ameri-
can national at the relevant times).
The Commission made an award to Petit without written opinion,
which was commented upon by the American Agent as follows:
As the Commission entertained jurisdiction notwithstanding
the naturalization of Petit in the United States in the year 1868,
it is to be assumed that the views of the special counsel were
accepted. It is not to be inferred, however that the Commission
reached the conclusion that the reinstatement of Petit as a French
citizen in the year 1881 was accepted as justifying jurisdiction,
but that the jurisdiction was found in the fact that he returned
to France in 1870, and had acted as a French citizen and had
been accepted as a French citizen for the period of ten years
and more previous to his formal reinstatement in citizenship
by the duly-constituted authorities.
6. The American-Venezuelan Commission under the Convention
of December 5, 1885.
In the Hammer and de Brissot cases 27 the claims were against
Venezuela on behalf of widows and their adult children who had
both Venezuelan and American nationality. They were all born in
and had always resided in Venezuela. The widows acquired American
nationality by marriage and the children by jus sanguinis. The Com-
mission unanimously held that the claimants were not American
nationals within the meaning of the treaty.
The Venezuelan commissioner said that in the national courts
of the United States or Venezuela the claimants would be considered
American or Venezuelan, respectively, but that before an interna-
2T I Moore, op. cit., 2456 ff., date not given.
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tional tribunal the question of their nationality is governed by inter-
national law. He then said:
[The widows] were born in Venezuela and both married
there to citizens of the United States in 1853, before the law of
1855 had made them also citizens of the United States. So the
citizenship which they afterwards acquired by operation of law
cannot be said to have been acquired consciously and voluntarily;
while, on the other hand, they have, after becoming widows, con-
tinued to reside in Venezuela without having ever made any dec-
laration whatever as to their desire of preserving such citizenship
or without having ever come to the United States, which seems to
show not only by the fact of their birth but also by their own
free will that they prefer the Venezuelan citizenship. To declare
them citizens of the United States against their express or pre-
sumptive good will would be contrary to the general principle of
right and to those of international law now prevailing .... 'Sup-
posing, finally, that an individual united in his person several
nationalities, it would be necessary to apply the law best agreeing
with his actual position, otherwise the question would be insolu-
ble.' (Heffter) ...
As to the children . . . they were also born in Venezuela
where they have been residing since the death of their fathers.
Having attained their majority they have not claimed the paternal
citizenship nor have they fixed their domicile in the United
States. This conjuncture of circumstances seems to clearly indi-
cate that they, too, have renounced the citizenship of their filiation
and chosen that of their birthplace and permanent domicile. Ac-
cording to the principles already invoked . . . that in case of
conflict between several citizenships that is to be preferred which
is more in accordance with the actual position of the person,
namely, that of the place of his actual residence and domicile,
the said children as well as their mothers must be held to be
Venezuelans and to have no standing before this Commission.
The American and neutral commissioners each filed an opinion
in substantial agreement with the Venezuelan commissioner on the
question of the claimants' nationality.
7. The Italian-Peruvian Arbitral Tribunal under the Protocol of
November 25, 1899.
In the Arata case (1900)28 the claimants against Peru were
children born in Peru of an Italian father. The Peruvian Govern-
ment argued against the claim on the ground the claimants were
2"Descamps et Renault, Recueil Int. des Traites du XXe Siecle (1901),
vol. 1, p. 709.
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Peruvian nationals jus soli. The arbitrator said that in cases of dual
nationality tribunals solve the conflict in accord with rules of in-
ternational law without calling into question the validity of either
nationality and allowed the claim on the ground of what he con-
sidered to be the "universally admitted principle" that internationally
the conflict is resolved by giving preference to the nationality of the
children's father when he is not domiciled in the country of the
children's birth.
8. The Venezuelan Arbitrations under the Protocols of 1902 &
1903.
The summer of 1903 saw assembled at Caracas eleven inter-
national arbitral tribunals appointed to adjudicate claims of as many
governments against Venezuela. Three of these tribunals rendered
written opinions in seven cases involving dual nationals, the rationale
in all being contrary to Borchard's supposed rule although he cites
two of them (Brignone & Maninat) in support thereof.
Plumly, umpire of the British-Venezuelan tribunal, decided the
Mathison and Stevenson cases.
In Mathison 2 claim was made on behalf of a British national
jus sanguinis who was born in Venezuela and who had always re-
sided in Venezuela. The umpire found that the claimant was also a
Venezuelan national jus soli and held that internationally the claimant
must be deemed to be only Venezuelan when jus soli links allegiance
to the de facto nationality of a country in which a man resides and
rears his children.
In Stevenson "0 claim was made on behalf of the estate of Steven-
son, a British national residing in Venezuela at the time of his death.
One of the principal parties in interest to the claim was Stevenson's
widow, a Venezuelan national by birth who had always resided in
Venezuela. The umpire dismissed the claim as to the widow "con-
sistently with his holding, and for the reasons and upon the authorities
given in the Mathison case," and also saying that:
* * * In the opinion of the umpire, where, as in this case,
there appears to be a conflict of laws constituting Mrs. Stevenson
a British subject under British law and a Venezuelan under Vene-
zuelan law the prevailing rule of public law, to which appeal
must then be taken, is that she is deemed to be a citizen of the
country in which she has her domicile; that is, Venezuela.
29 Ralston, Venezuelan Arbs. of 1903 (1904), p. 429.
20 Id., p. 438.
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The umpire also referred to the conditions under which Mrs.
Stevenson's British nationality might be held as predominant:
Had Mr. Stevenson taken his wife within the dominions of
Great Britain to reside, and had he there remained and died,
leaving her domiciled there, and were she asserting a claim before
this tribunal as one still domiciled in Great Britain or its
dependencies, in the opinion of the umpire the law of Great
Britain might well be taken as the controlling law and she be held
to be a citizen of Great Britain as against Venezuela, notwith-
standing the law of Venezuela reestablishing her citizenship in
that country after the death of her husband.81
Ralston, umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan tribunal, decided the
Brignone, Miliani, and Poggioli cases.
In Brignone 82 the claim was against Venezuela on behalf of
the widow of an Italian national, the widow being born and always
residing in Venezuela. The umpire first quoted the respective civil
codes of Italy and Venezuela each to the effect that a native-born
woman marrying a foreigner and becoming a widow having resided
all the time at her original home reassumes her original nationality.
The umpire then said that in his opinion "there is not a true conflict
of laws, if we read the foregoing extracts with due regard to their
spirit," thus implying that at the death of her Italian husband the
claimant lost her Italian nationality. The umpire also said that if the
claimant is considered to be a dual national the rule is that the law
which governs her status is the law of her domicile, citing in support
thereof of Frazer's opinion in Alexander.
Both these conflicting reasons can hardly be considered the
rationale of the umpire's decision to reject the claim but it is im-
possible definitely to state which is the ground from a reading of the
decision. However, Ralston's own text 33 states that the holding
in this case is the same as in Stevenson and Mathison.
The headnote written by Ralston to his opinion in Miliani ,
states that "in cases of double citizenship neither country can claim
the person having the same as against the other nation although it may
as against all other countries." However, the opinion of the umpire
accepts residence or domicile as "furnishing the rule in case of con-
flict" and refers for authority to "the decisions cited in the Brignone
31 Id., p. 445.
32M., p. 710.
83 Ralston, The Law & Procedure of Int. Tribunals (1926), p. 171, n. 4.
34 Ralston, Venezuelan Arbs. of 1903 (1904), p. 754.
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case." The headnote is therefore inconsistent with the written opinion
and the latter is, of course, controlling.
In Poggioli " there is no discussion of the point in Ralston's
opinion but the headnote by him states that "the widow and children
of an aggrieved Italian, who were all born in Venezuela and have
always lived in that country, cannot claim as Italian subjects before
this Commission (affirming Brignone and Miliani cases)."
Plumly, who was also umpire of the French-Venezuelan tribunal,
decided the Maninat & Massiani cases.
In Maninat 6 the claim was against Venezuela on behalf of the
heirs of a French national. It appeared that some of the heirs were
nationals of both France and Venezuela. The umpire in deciding
against the claim of the heirs who were dual nationals pointed out
that they were born and reared in Venezuela and held that "In a
conflict of laws as to nationalities the law of the place of domicile
should prevail." He then referred to his opinion in Mathison and
Stevenson pointing out that they were similar holdings by him and
invited attention to his reasons and the authorities supporting them
discussed in those cases.
In Massiani " the claim was against Venezuela on behalf of the
widow and children of a French national. In his opinion discussing
the claim the umpire said:
The widow was born in Venezuela, achieved French nation-
ality by the laws of both countries when she married Thomas
Massiani, but by the laws of Venezuela was restored to her quality
as a Venezuela citizen at his death. During their married life they
remained in Venezuela; they were there domiciled when he died.
It has always been her domicile. It is therefore her nationality,
since such is the law of her domicile, which law prevails when
there is a conflict as held by the umpire in the claim of Maninat
heirs before this same tribunal. The children of this marriage
were all born in Venezuela. By the voluntary action of their
father this was their birthplace. It has always been their domicile,
first through the paternal selection and later through their own
choice. Hence, governed by the laws of their domicile, they are
Venezuelans ...
This case is on all fours with that of the estate of Stevenson,
decided by the umpire in the British-Venezuelan Mixed Com-
35 Id., p. 847.
36 Ralston & Doyle, French-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission of
1902 (1906), p. 44.
3 7 Id., p. 211.
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mission of 1903 .... The reasons there given and the authori-
ties there accumulated are directly in point in this case ...
9. The Canevaro case (Italy v. Peru), Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion under the Agreement of April 25, 1910.8"
In this case one of the claimants, Rafael Canevaro, was Italian
jus sanguinis and Peruvian jus soli. The tribunal held (1912) that
"Peru has a right . . . to deny his status as an Italian claimant"
because "as a matter of fact, Rafael Canevaro has on several occasions
acted as a Peruvian citizen" by running as a candidate for the Peruvian
Senate and defending his election thereto and by securing the authori-
zation of the Peruvian Government and Congress for his acceptance
of the office of Consul General of The Netherlands.
10. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals after World War I.
The various peace treaties after World War I entitled the na-
tionals of the victor states to file certain claims against the defeated
states before a series of Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, who ignored
Borchard's supposed rule.
In the Hein case 89 before the British-German tribunal the claim-
ant did not lose his original German nationality when he became a
naturalized British subject. Moreover, his British naturalization
certificate contained an express reservation to the effect that within
the limits of his country of origin he was not to be deemed a British
subject. Nevertheless the tribunal held that because the claimant
was a British national he had the right to file a claim.
In the Grigoriou case 40 before the Bulgarian-Greek tribunal
Bulgaria objected to the claim against it on the ground the claimant
was a Bulgarian national but the tribunal held that the claimant had a
right to file the claim simply because he was a Greek national.
The French-German tribunal decided the Blumenthal ' and
de Montfort 42 cases each involving a claim against Germany on behalf
of a claimant who possessed French and German nationality. In
Blumenthal the tribunal simply rejected the German defense based
upon the claimant's German nationality and held he was entitled to
claim. In de Montfort the tribunal held the claimant was entitled to
88 Scott, Hague Ct. Rep. 284 (1916).
l II Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (1920-1925),
p. 71.
40 111 Id., p. 977.
41 Id., p. 616.
42 VI Id., p. 806.
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claim on the ground of effective French nationality because the
claimant had never ceased to live in France and there exercise the
duties of citizenship.
The French-Turkish tribunal decided the Apostolidis case,
in which Turkey defended on the ground that the claimants retained
Turkish nationality even though naturalized as French, and that under
Turkish law the French naturalization was void. The tribunal recog-
nized the standing of the claimants as French nationalists saying
that under international law the naturalization must be recognized
by "all other judicial authorities, including the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal. .. ."
The Tripartite Claims Commission, United States, Austria,
and Hungary, decided the Tellech" (1928) and Fox " (1929) cases
involving dual nationals of the United States and Austria. The basis
of the claims was the claimants' enforced military service by the
Austrian authorities. The claims were denied on the ground that the
claimants' continued residence in Austrian territory after adulthood
was a voluntary subjection by them to the duties of their Austrian
nationality.
11. The Inter-War Period
Borchard's formulation of the rule regarding dual nationals
reached a limited zenith before three tribunals in the period between
the two world wars, either by way of dictum or summary treatment
of the problem, based upon deference to the authority of Borchard
without any independent examination of past arbitral opinions. More-
over, viewing these three tribunals' decisions in historical perspective
it seems significant that in every case the claimants were born in
the territory of the respondent government and resided there at the
time of loss or injury for which claim was made.
In the Pinson case (1928)48 before the French-Mexican tribunal
under the convention of September 24, 1924, the claim against Mexico
was entertained on the finding that the claimant possessed only French
nationality. But in dictum, if the claimant had been also a Mexican
national, the tribunal seemed to imply that it might have considered
the claim to be barred but for the fact that the Mexican authorities
43 VIII Id., p. 373.
44 Decisions & Opinions, p. 71.
15 Id., p. 73.
46 Annual Digest of Public Int. Law Cases 1927-28, Case No. 195.
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had never treated the claimant as Mexican in all the years of his
residence there.
The British-Mexican tribunal under the convention of November
18, 1926, considered three claims against Mexico by dual British-
Mexican nationals born and residing in Mexico: Oldenbourg (1929) ,'
Adams and Blackmore (1931),8 and Honey (1931)."' Mexican
counsel in defense relied solely on the treatises of Borchard 0 and
Ralston." British counsel agreed, instead of briefing the issue, and
so the tribunal rejected the claims.
The American-Egyptian tribunal under the protocol of January
20, 1931, created to decide the claim of Salem (1932)," a naturalized
American born in Egypt, found that the claimant was not an Egyptian
national but in dictum cited Borchard 11 approvingly.
12. The American-Italian Conciliation Commission " under the
Treaty of Peace with Italy of February 10, 1947.
This tribunal's leading case is Mergg (1955)" in which the
United States espoused a claim on behalf of a dual American-Italian
national. The issue of the legal effect of the claimant's Italian nation-
ality was exhaustively briefed by counsel. The tribunal unanimously
held the claim was barred on the ground the claimant's conduct
manifested an intent to be effectively an Italian national, but adopted
as a rule of decision for future cases the criterion of the claimant's
closer and more effective bond with either the claimant or respondent
state:
The principle, based on the sovereign equality of States,
which excludes diplomatic protection in the case of dual nation-
ality, must yield before the principle of effective nationality when-
ever such nationality is that of the claiming State. But it must not
yield when such predominance is not proved, because the first of
these two principles is generally recognized and may constitute
47 Decisions & Opinions, p. 97.
4 8 Further Dec. & Ops., p. 199.
4 9 Id., p. 13.
50 Op. cit., p. 588.
51 Op. cit., n. 33 above.
52 III Hackworth, Digest of Int. Law 166-167.
3 Op. cit., p. 588.
4 The Commission was created to deal with disputes over treaty provisions
concerning the property in Italy of Allied nationals and operated as an
arbitral tribunal whenever it was necessary to add a "third member" due to
disagreement of the two national commissioners.
55 [1955] I.L.R. 443.
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a criterion of practical application for the elimination of any
possible uncertainty ...
In order to establish the prevalence of the United States
nationality in individual cases, habitual residence can be one of
the criteria of evaluation, but not the only one. The conduct of
the individual in his economic, social, political, civil and family
life, as well as the closer and more effective bond with one of the
two States must be considered. 56
Conclusion
In the following dictum of the Nottebohm case before the Inter-
national Court of Justice the true rationale of the foregoing century
and a half history of the treatment by international tribunals of the
claims of dual nationals against one of the governments of the
claimant's nationality has been captured in its essence and with such
succinct perspicacity: "
International arbitrators have decided in the same way nu-
merous cases of dual nationality, where the question arose with
regard to the exercise of protection. They have given their
preference to the real and effective nationality, that which ac-
corded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between
the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is
involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their
importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual
residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but
there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his
family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by
him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
56 The tribunal's subsequent application of this rule of decision in fifty-two
cases is summarized by its President in Messia, "La protection diplomatique en
cas de double nationalite," published in Hommage d'une generation de juristes
au President Basdevant (1960), pp. 547-558. The Anglo-Italian Commission
under the same treaty also followed the same rule of decision in numerous
cases.
57 I.C.J. Reps., 1955, p. 4.
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